THE New Republic

Will Dewey Be the GOP '56 Choice?

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Washington Wire .... T.R.B.

We take as our text today two quotations from *Time* magazine. The first says categorically, "Eisenhower was the first President in US history to give the Vice President important new duties." Sorry, *Time*; this is incorrect. The learned Eric Sevareid points out in a broadcast that it was FDR who put the VP (Garner) into the Cabinet meeting where he has stayed; FDR made Henry Wallace head of a separate agency, the Board of Economic Warfare (a position no VP before or since has held); it was Truman, not Ike, who made the VP a statutory member of the National Security Council, far more important in policy making than the Cabinet.

In the same issue last week *Time* observed, "The record shows that Nixon never adopted Joe McCarthy's unjust line that the Democratic Party is the party of treason."

Come, come *Time*, this won't do. As our Catholic contemporary *Commonweal* wrote after the 1954 election, "the sophisticated demagoguery of Richard Nixon may prove more disastrous . . . than the hit-and-miss methods of Joseph McCarthy ever threatened to be." He was speaking McCarthyism, it said, "in the winning accents of Jack Armstrong, the All-American Boy." The facts are there; the record shows it. In the 1954 campaign Nixon took over the dirty job of equating Democrats with softness-to-Communism, and Ike praised him when he was through.

Our research facilities don't equal *Time's*, but here are some items.

United Press dispatch from Las Vegas, Oct. 25, 1954—"Vice President Richard Nixon says that if a Congress of Adlai Stevenson's choosing is elected, 'the security risks which have been fired by the Eisenhower Administration will all be hired back.' . . . The Vice President said the 1952 Democratic Presidential Candidate 'has not changed since he testified for Alger Hiss'."

Cheyenne, Wyo., Oct. 23 (official Nixon text): "It is time to talk frankly and bluntly about the most sinister element of this campaign to date. Why is the Communist Party of the United States fighting so desperately and openly for the defeat of the Republican candidates . . . for the election of an anti-Eisenhower Congress?"

Phoenix, Ariz., Oct. 25 (official text): ". . . Mr. Stevenson testified for Hiss. . . . The only way to get the security risks out of the government and to keep them out is to elect a Republican Congress which will support the President's security program."

These are only random samples. Eisenhower apologized after the 1954 election; Nixon, on the contrary, quoted "shrewd" political observers as telling him the GOP lost because it had not handled the Communist issue "as vigorously as it could." (*Editorial Research Report*, Nov. 10, 1954)

Nixon may have grown since those days. It may surprise some of our readers to know that we have watched him attentively in the difficult days since Eisenhower's heart attack and that we believe he has handled himself with discretion and dignity. But *Time* can't whitewash past facts, and we hope the Luce organization will fight the evident temptation to try to do so in the present GOP crisis.

It is to the honor of the Luce organization that it still has the capacity to surprise. Last week *Life* carried a denunciation of the Mississippi murder of the Negro child, Emmett Till. It was an old Testament warning, elemental and magnificent. It said simply that God has His eye on villainy and loves the humble and bides His time—even after judges have spoken. It peeled off several layers of Christian apathy, we thought, to this black deed. We sometimes wish the editors of *Time* and *Life* could get together more. As Franklin's "Poor Richard" wrote in 1758: "Time is the stuff that Life is made of."

If Adlai Stevenson becomes President—as now seems not impossible—how will he be different from Eisenhower? We have been giving the matter some thought. In the first place, certain things probably would NOT happen. We consider Stevenson a middle-roader, probably to the right of Harriman. He deliberately indicated that in Wisconsin last week.

There would not be another spectacular Roosevelt "New Deal," fiscal policy would probably be fairly orthodox, the brakes would not be thrown away. The temper of America today is not explosive, as it was when FDR took over. FDR prevented a real revolution by providing a social revolution. We don't see that under Adlai.

What would happen then? Well, we would hope to see a President who spent more time at his desk. He would read the newspapers. He would know what was going on. Business would be represented but not to the exclusion of other strains of American thought. There would be a faster movement of social legislation and more sympathy for the little fellow.

This would be illustrated in specific changes here. Instead of signing the tidelands oil grab bill as Ike did, Adlai would veto it. (He courageously proclaimed that in 1952, and so he lost Texas.)

Under Adlai we wouldn't expect any more Dixon-Yates contracts. FBI Director Hoover would be reminded that he is a cop and not a policy-maker. Adlai would restore independence to the regulatory agencies. This might be almost the most important thing he did domestically. (Every present member of the five-man Securities and Exchange Commission, for instance, is now either an ex-banker, or an ex-attorney for investment bankers.) On the foreign side, the internationalism which Ike adopted from Truman and Acheson, and protected from his Old Guard would be continued. We imagine times when Stevenson would disappoint some liberals. On the other hand he is about the only compromise we see acceptable to both the North and the South.

We imagine one other possibility. With Adlai President, the one-party press would again give cry. The Old Guard would revive. The most depressing and really frightening thing since the German upper class accepted Hitler was the American upper class acceptance of McCarthyism and Nixonism. That might happen again, too.

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BEHIND THE HEADLINES

Broken Glass and Tacks on Nixon's Path

AROUND the Washington Press Club the opinion is overwhelming that the Republican Party will nominate the 42-year-old Richard Nixon for President at the San Francisco Cow Palace next August. These educated opinions (not an expression of correspondents' preference) are more one-sided in number than the findings of the first Gallup Poll taken after the President was stricken, in which Republican voters were asked what candidate they would vote for today if Eisenhower and Chief Justice Warren were out of the running. The results: Nixon 33 percent, Thomas E. Dewey 15 percent, and John Foster Dulles 12 percent. No other candidate received more than 5 percent.

Despite these predictions and preferences, a guarded "stop Nixon" movement was already underway within the Republican party during the first two weeks of the President's illness, and the movement involved forces whose influence had been decisive in the past. Developments which put the "stop Nixon" drive in forward gear include:

1. Presidential Assistant Sherman Adams and the White House staff, who as a group loathe Nixon, blocked efforts for the legal delegation of Presidential powers to Nixon, and Adams is now trying to head off any statement by Eisenhower in Denver that he prefers Nixon as his successor.

2. Nixon's Republican rival in California, Gov. Goodwin Knight, announced his intention to lead the Republican delegation to the Republican National Convention as a "favorite son candidate," regardless of what Nixon does. The Nixon-Knight rivalry dates back two years to a fight over selection of a new Republican chairman for California.

3. Members of the Eastern finance-industry group who were most influential in persuading Eisenhower to run in 1952 and contributed most of his campaign expenses now oppose Nixon, first because they think he can't win, second because they are not sure of his convictions on international co-operation and trade which provide the successful climate for the business of this group. These men are casting about for another candidate. They intend to press their views upon Eisenhower, and will have the full co-operation of Mr. Adams' palace guard in getting into the sick room.

4. Former associates of Thomas E. Dewey, some of whom hold key posts in the Eisenhower Administration, decided several months before the President's illness that Dewey should prepare himself as a possible candidate for Vice President on the Eisenhower ticket in 1956, and in order to re-establish himself in public attention, recommended that Dewey take a trip around the world. This happened to fit in with needs of Dewey's private legal clients abroad, and unfortunately for Dewey, his plane took off at 2:30 P.M., Saturday, September 24, at approximately the same moment that news of the President's heart attack was flashed from Denver.

5. Professional Republican politicos feel that Nixon could not win in 1956 if he ran without Eisenhower on the ticket. Most of those "pros" were in Washington recently for the Republican campaign school: then they were enthusiastic about an Eisenhower-Nixon slate. There was no talk then about a man to replace Ike. But Republican National Committee staff who were in touch with the state chairmen since the President was stricken report a change of attitude on Nixon. The man they considered excellent for Number 2 may be wholly unacceptable as Number 1. As practical politicians, they know Nixon has made too many enemies to unite either the party or the nation.

Evidence to support the shift away from Nixon can be picked up only in private conversations, not for quotation. Informants are cautious not only out of a decent respect for the President in his illness, but also because of the peculiar position of the Vice President. Mr. Nixon remains the constitutional successor to the President until January 20, 1957, and might at any moment be called upon to take the reins of the government, and the Republican Party as well. If this should occur before August, 1956,



Teammates Brownell, Nixon and Adams

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Nixon would probably be renominated with little fight. To undermine him now could conceivably weaken the future security of the United States. Moreover, Mr. Nixon is one of the principal brokers of the Eisenhower Administration in selling its legislation to the Congress; an attack upon the Vice President now could jeopardize the 1956 program.

The test of strength between Nixon and the White House staff came during the first 24 hours after the heart attack, and within five days Mr. Nixon was boxed in by a series of actions engineered by Sherman Adams.

It is known that Nixon spent the night following Mr. Eisenhower's attack in consultation with Acting Attorney General William P. Rogers, a fellow Californian; next morning the papers carried informed stories that Nixon was in a position to "dominate the Administration as the President's deputy." It is not publicly known whether Nixon urged Rogers to draw up an immediate delegation of powers, as one columnist reported; or whether the two men were struggling to answer a request from Denver for a legal opinion on delegation of powers. Whatever the facts, Nixon was soon struck out by three curves.

Strike one: Sherman Adams hitched a ride back from a vacation in France in the plane of General Alfred Gruenther, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, accompanied by the General himself, and arrived in Washington by Monday morning, the first business day of the President's illness. Within an hour after alighting at the Air Transport Command terminal, Adams was in conference at the White House with Nixon, Acting Attorney General Rogers, and the President's special counsel, Gerald Morgan. After three hours Rogers emerged to announce, "It may not be necessary to make any formal delegation of powers to other persons." (It was only a coincidence that by the end of the first week Mr. Adams' hitchhiking host, General Gruenther, was being suggested as a possible Republican candidate for President.)

Strike two: Attorney General Brownell was rushed by Embassy plane to Madrid, then placed on a commercial airliner on a few hours notice, and arrived in Washington less than 24 hours after Adams. The three-hour legal session of the previous day was repeated for Brownell's benefit, and when press photographers were admitted to the conference, they snapped a shot of the three principals—Nixon looking dour, Brownell bemused, and Adams, in a rare show of warmth, betraying a canary-swallowing smirk (see p. 3). Asked for comment, Nixon said the only purpose was to "bring Brownell up to date." Brownell said he saw nothing in the immediate future that required any delegation of powers. Adams had nothing to add.

Strike three: At the National Security Council meeting which Nixon called for Thursday of the first week of Eisenhower's illness, and chaired himself, it was decided "among the principals present" that Nixon would remain in Washington, and that Sherman Adams would commute between Washington and Denver, controlling the flow of any official business or persons into the sickroom, yet returning to Washington on Thursday and Friday to observe the meetings of the Security Council and Cabinet which Nixon would chair.

Evidence of this Nixon-Adams struggle is all circumstantial. The day after Adams flew to Denver one of the top members of the White House staff told a friend how "Sherm" had fixed Nixon. He described the letter which Adams wrote himself, and carried to Denver for the President's signature, instructing Nixon to carry on the Cabinet and Security Council meetings. Aside from the legal purpose of the letter, it helped allay suspicion that Adams was about to put a headlock on the Vice President. Adams' first word to the Washington staff, the informant stated, was that he feared more than anything else that the President might issue an early endorsement of Nixon as his successor.

To know how potent his influence might be, one must know Mr. Adams as an operator. This wintry-looking man is 56 and trained for his job through 17 years in the lumber business, a term as a Congressman, and four years as governor of New Hampshire. Since 1953 he has controlled all access to the President's desk. The President has delegated to him the supervision over all departments of government except three—State, Defense and Treasury. He is the boss of Republican patronage, letting the President take credit when things go well, and himself taking the hard knocks when they do not. When Clarence Manion was to be fired as Chairman of the Commission on Inter-governmental Relations, it was Mr. Adams who broke the news to him. When former Senator Harry Cain began his attacks upon the government security system, it was Mr. Adams who gave him "unshirted hell," as Cain described it.

The men about Eisenhower think and act as Adams does. This includes General Wilton "Slick" Persons, chief lobbyist; Fred Seaton, ex-Senator from Nebraska, the political trouble-shooter; Max Rabb, secretary to the Cabinet and former assistant to Henry Cabot Lodge; Jack Martin, former assistant to Senator Taft, now the White House ambassador to the Republican right wing; Jim Hagerty, the press secretary; Bernard

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Shanley, the counsel and former Stassen man; and Gerald Morgan, assistant counsel. These men comprise the Adams team.

There are few things this group asked the President to do since 1953 that were not carried out as recommended. All their skill and influence is now being applied to the Nixon question.

The international financial-industrial community which persuaded Ike to run in 1952 includes such men as Thomas Watson, top man at International Business Machines, who engineered Eisenhower's appointment as president of Columbia University; Winthrop Aldrich of Chase National Bank, now Ambassador to Great Britain; John J. McCloy, investment banker who served as Assistant Secretary of War in World War II and later as President of the World Bank and US High Commissioner for Germany; and Lucius Clay, Eisenhower's deputy commander in Berlin, now Chairman of the Board of Continental Can.

Any list of Eisenhower's business friends who predominate at his stag dinners, his golfing parties at Savannah, and his house parties in Denver is composed largely of the bankers and industrialists who picked him for the Republican candidate before the 1952 convention. For example, the *Denver Post* reported that the President's golfing party on Labor Day, two weeks before his heart attack, was made up of the following: W. Alton Jones, President of Cities Service Oil; Robert W. Woodruff, Board Chairman of Coca-Cola; L. F. McCollum, President of Continental Oil; William Reed, Board Chairman of General Electric; Cliff Roberts, New York investment banker; William E. Robinson, President of Coca-Cola; and E. D. Slater, President of Frankfort Distillers.

Men with these affiliations have several things in common. First they deal in foreign trade and investment, to a large or small degree, and believe that foreign trade represents the margin of prosperity for the American free enterprise system. Second, they believe their enterprises will prosper under a "businessman's administration." And third, they have the resources for a political campaign, without which a candidate is unlikely to win. This is the group that backed Thomas E. Dewey through two unsuccessful campaigns, and it was they who backed Eisenhower against Taft in 1952.

The evidence that these bankers and industrialists do not support Nixon is admittedly fragmentary. During the past fortnight several Washington lawyers who attend numerous corporation board meetings in New York and Boston have returned from a series of such gatherings. Independent of each other they report that in each meeting when politics was discussed, Nixon was brushed aside as a sure loser, and that talk turned to other candidates. The kind of candidate they seek must be nationally known, in order to win in a 60-day campaign after the convention. He must be non-partisan to carry on the Eisenhower middle-of-the-road policies and minimize conflict with the Republican right wing. He must be a non-military man to avoid tagging the Republicans as an army party. And he should—preferably—come from outside the professional politicians, because the Republican possibilities in this group are shopworn. The names canvassed included Massachusetts Governor Christian Herter, the President's brother Milton Eisenhower, and Treasury Secretary George Humphrey, all considered able but lacking national stature. Chief Justice Earl Warren, even if he were willing to run, is anathema to the South because he wrote the opinion on segregated schools, and the Republicans will need to hold the four Southern states Eisenhower captured in 1952. Paul Hoffman, though nationally known as administrator of the Marshall Plan, is anathema to the Republican right wing as the first President of the Fund for the Republic.

The least objectionable to these financial leaders among the obvious candidates so far is Thomas Dewey, but such a choice would not be accepted with enthusiasm, even among those who backed Dewey in 1944 and 1948. The search for a suitable candidate goes on, and it may be assumed that as soon as these men of financial power have made their choice, they will be in touch with Sherman Adams for a conference with the convalescent Eisenhower.

Thomas Dewey's former aides who now hold posts under Eisenhower include Attorney General Brownell, who served as Chairman of the Republican National Committee in the Dewey days; Jim Hagerty, the President's press secretary, who held the same position under Dewey for many years; and William Rogers, the Deputy Attorney General, who, though recently friendly with Nixon, did signal work under Dewey's direction at the Republican national convention in 1952.

The idea that Dewey should polish up his public name before the 1956 convention reportedly came from within this group, and the trip around the world, while probably planned as a business trip, was made more spectacular by arranging calls on a number of chiefs of state, and was timed to be completed before the electioneering starts.

President Eisenhower owes a great debt to Dewey for his work in the 1952 campaign. Dewey, it will be recalled, provided professional organizers from his own staff for the Eisenhower bandwagon, early in the nomination fight. Moreover, it was Dewey who invented the charge of "vote stealing" against Senator Taft in a number of Southern states, including Texas. It was Dewey who put through the Conference of Republican Governors immediately before the 1952 convention, a "fair play resolution" which recommended to the Republican Convention that no delegate whose credentials were challenged should be allowed to vote on the seating of any other delegate. This viewpoint prevailed in the Convention contributing materially to the defeat of Taft and the nomination of Eisenhower.

The President, a man in whom loyalty is deeply engraved, would thus have reason to look favorably upon a Dewey nomination in 1956 if the businessmen should fall back upon Dewey as the man for the hour.

In recent years a Republican candidate for the Presidential nomination has had to gain the backing of two distinct power groups in order to carry the convention. One is the financial group which supplies the campaign funds. The other is the Party hierarchy, consisting this year of 21 Republican state governors, the 48 Republican state chairmen who are full-time professionals, and the 96 state Committeemen and Committeewomen, who make up the Republican National Committee.

But there is one vote that will count for more than all these combined, and that is the choice of President Eisenhower. If he expresses a preference, it will be heeded, for this is more than ever a coattail campaign. Nixon is gambling entirely on that one vote.

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France: Rebellion within the High Command

THE Fourth French Republic is being ripped apart at the seams. The sound of the tearing was plainly audible during the National Assembly debate on Edgar Faure's policy in North Africa. The formal issue in that debate was confidence in the present French government; the real issues were the continued existence of the present republican and democratic French state, and the nature of a different—militarized if not dictatorial—state role in the defense of the West and the free world.

It is nothing new for top French officials in North Africa to flout orders given them by the central government. Robert Schuman has described for example how, when he was foreign minister and responsible for Morocco and Tunisia, residents-general made policy in defiance of Paris. But this is the first time disobedience has been openly concerted between the French inhabitants of North Africa, a military resident-general and a military member of the French government, on the scarcely concealed orders of the first soldier of France, Marshal Alphonse Juin.



General Koenig was asked to resign from a Cabinet, along with three other Gaullist members, only after they had announced the totally unconstitutional intention to ask President Coty to form a "government of public safety." But General Boyer de Latour remains in charge of Morocco after having made a deal with *Presence Française,* the powerful movement of the French colonists which is blocking Faure's policy. And the government has not only failed to deal with Marshal Juin as President Truman did with General MacArthur, it dare not even breathe a suggestion of criticism of his dangerous machinations.

France is protesting bitterly that Spain, Egypt and the Arab League are supporting what she condemns as a rebellion and others hail as a war of liberation in Morocco. That is true. But these allies of the Arab uprising are all accessories after the fact of a rebellion within the high command of French authority itself.

Nor is it entirely new for a serious governmental crisis in France to threaten a state crisis. The form of the state has always been open to question. But this is the first time since the day of General Boulanger 70 years ago, that the challenge has come from within the ranks of the leading servants of the present state, soldiers sworn to absolute loyalty. And it brings into question France's part in Europe and the world because the man who inspires and directs it, Marshal Juin, is in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces in Central Europe one of the handful of officers who share major responsibility for the military defense of the West.

The tragedy of the present French situation is that the chances of preserving the spirit of Geneva and of giving it practical substances are being jeopardized because French military leaders are playing politics and French politicians are more concerned with their own survival than the free world's. The walk-out at the UN, after the vote on putting Algeria on the agenda, was to a considerable degree a grand-stand play made with an eye on the domestic French political situation. It was intended to mobilize nationalist sentiment within France and to make up for prestige lost by the Faure government because of its grotesque mishandling of the Moroccan problem.

Similarly, the cancellation of the planned trip of Faure and Foreign Minister Pinay to Moscow had a similar purpose. The vote at the UN was an excuse rather than a cause. It had long been common knowledge that Pinay did not want to go to Moscow. While he does not go as far as the Gaullists or as nearly all the members of his own party, his disagreement with his nominal chief, Faure, on most aspects of foreign policy has been glaring.

Faure's folly was to believe that he could carry out Pierre Mendès-France's foreign policy with a foreign minister who, both politically and personally, stands for forces totally opposed to PMF's ideas. Moreover Pinay, a man with no training or experience whatsoever in foreign affairs, was forced to rely on the advice of professionals at the Quai d'Orsay who hanker after the good old days of the cold war, before the aberration of Eisenhower's new spirit. Naturally such a man was an excellent foil for the proponents of blood-and-guts in North Africa, while Faure, with even greater folly, was trying to use General Boyer de Latour to carry out Gilbert Grandval's program of reform and concessions in Morocco.

Grandval recognized, when he got to Morocco, that the great mistake had been to fail to provide a start toward the reforms promised after the deposition of Sultan ben Yussef—which, by the way, was largely the work of Juin. There is still no real alternative to the Grandval policy. Certainly, the kind of repression which the French colonists and the Juin men want can only produce real civil war. The only question is whether the Grandval reforms will suffice.

Mendès-France understood that the only course that could recover some degree of domestic unity was a combination of sane nationalization with a New Deal. Losses had to be cut, hence the Indo-China "settlement." Faure dreamed of continuing PMF's program. He has failed.

The Faure government reached a new low of honor, decency, logic and simple common sense when Pinay formally complained to Ambassador Dillon that the US had not done enough to prevent Liberia, the Philippines and some Latin American countries from voting in the UN to air the Algerian problem. This after a whole series of French governments had "resisted" US and Atlantic policy in the name of sovereignty and independence. And it is typical of disintegration of French values that even the neutralist *Monde* of Paris, once a great champion of the absolute equality of all nations, small as well as large, against the super-powers, should join the chorus of insults directed at the nations which voted against the official French thesis on Algeria. When small nations voted against the US, they were noble and brave; now, when they vote against France, they are undemocratic, uncivilized, unworthy to have the right to vote.

What seems to have happened in France is a crumbling of values resulting from a crumbling of the pattern of the cold war. The French have not readjusted themselves—it isn't surprising in a country where everything new is held in suspicion. There has been complaint for the last half dozen years that Germany had blackmail power because bot

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the West and East needed and wanted Germany; but there hasn't been awareness that France, with her powerful Communist Party and movement, also kept up front, nominally a big power, by simultaneously holding US support and holding off the practical implications of full co-operation with the Atlantic powers.

The time for this game is finished. France cannot have both the advantages of strength and of weakness. Mendès-France was the first French statesman to dare to break out of the pattern of a nation which had both lost the war and won it: he acted on the assumption that France had lost this one (and the one in Indo-China too) and would go on to try to win a place in the peace. But the almost certain indefinite postponement of another great war, the inevitability of peace, wasn't as close to factual reality a year ago as it seems now. PMF didn't have to gear his policies to this inevitability of peace.

Faure has; and he hasn't been able to cope with peace. So perhaps France may have another local war on her hands —a civil war in North Africa. This time there won't be help from outside; on the contrary! And the fact of such a war, France's alone, may not be as good a gambit for domestic French politics as was the permanent threat of war for a permanently "victimized" France.

In essence, the North Africa drama and tragedy, so painful, disturbing and dangerous in the world framework, is another act in domestic French politics. Elections will be held in six or seven months. PMF has started campaigning, stomping up and down the country, making speeches. The weekly *Express* has become a daily to serve as his mouthpiece and official organ. Pinay started his campaigning at the UN. All the others are at it, not the least the Gaullists—only Juin is now their hope rather than Charles de Gaulle.

Faure rules from day to day and yet may survive. For no real political leader, with big ambitions, wants to have power now, not even PMF. They all want to wait for and win the elections. And all, including PMF, expect PMF to win. Hence the threat to the French state. The world should know that in France today the generals, inspired by Juin, are acting like some of their Latin-American confreres.

Paris PERCY WINNER

The UN: Pressure from the New Nations

HOWEVER much one may deplore its manner, the French walk-out from the United Nations Assembly may do good if it forces attention on an issue which helped to wreck the League of Nations.

Any attempt to bring some order into the international anarchy tends to confirm the pattern of power relations existing at the moment—to reinforce the *status quo*. For this reason it may soon appear to those dissatisfied with the existing situation as an alliance of the "haves" against the "have-nots." And in a period of change the growing pressure of the "have-nots" may wreck all progress to world order unless the international institutions are responsive to such pressure. We saw this process at work in the Thirties with the creation of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis. And the seeds of an even more dangerous plant are sprouting today in the UN.

The United Nations began as a wartime alliance of certain white peoples against other white peoples—and the Japanese. It was founded at a time when the colored peoples of Africa and Asia were largely under imperial rule, with Chiang's China as their only representative at the higher levels of the organization. In the decade which has passed since then most of Asia and part of Africa has achieved independence. But this has not brought any formal increase in the power of Asia to mold the development of the United Nations. Indeed the fact that Chiang still holds China's seat in the Security Council although he does not hold authority in China means that Asia has less formal power today than she had before throwing off colonial rule. Moreover, on many issues directly concerning Asia, Western manipulation of small countries' votes has produced formal majorities for solutions which most Asians oppose.

In this situation it is not surprising that the Asian countries regard the rules of the United Nations with scant respect. Lacking the formal power which their status and population merit, they use their influence in the Assembly to force discussion of issues which are clearly excluded from the United Nations purview by the Charter. And Western insistence on observing the letter of the law only confirms the Asians in the feeling that international law is a device for protecting white imperialism. The dangers of this situation would be great enough even if Communism did not exist. But at a period when the Asian and African peoples could swing the balance of power between the Soviet bloc and the democracies, it is madness for the West to give Asia a common interest with the Communist bloc.

This is an immense problem with innumerable facets. But there is one issue of crucial importance on which the West can and must take an initiative very soon. That is the representation of Asia in the higher organs of the UN. At present China is the only Asian member and China is not in fact represented because so far the American Administration has found no way of making Mao's admission acceptable to the American people. Yet inside America the situation is more favorable today than it may be in a year's time. With a Republican Administration and shared responsibility in Congress it might be possible to keep the China issue out of party politics. But if Eisenhower does not run next year and the Democrats win, the temptation to resurrect the old bogies may prove irresistible.

At the same time Russia is clearly preparing a line on United Nations membership which will have maximum appeal outside the USA. She will demand the blanket admission of all excluded governments—even Franco Spain. There is an overwhelming case for the Western Governments to anticipate such an initiative, providing they can agree on a policy which the United States can accept. I believe that the answer is to balance Red China's admission to a permanent seat on the Security Council by increasing the number of permanent members so as to include representatives of free Asia and Latin America—India and perhaps Brazil. It would be difficult for Russia to oppose such a proposal, and the West would gain great credit by making it. But time is short. President Eisenhower's illness may curtail still further the period in which America could achieve a bipartisan solution of the China problem.

London DENIS HEALEY, M.P.

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THE SUPREME COURT

Where Discretion is the Better Part of Valor

EACH YEAR on the first Monday in October, the crier intones his traditional chant; the Justices of the Supreme Court take their seats for the first time in over three months; squadrons of attorneys, each having paid his $25 fee to bask for a moment in the benign geniality of the Chief Justice, are admitted to practice at the bar of the Court; and the Court then retires for another week.

Yet the observer should not be too ready to see in all this an anachronistic deliberateness on a par with the tradition which puts the opening of the Court's daily sessions at twelve noon. Neither the week after nor the weeks before the short formal sittings on the first Monday in October are weeks of vacation.

Perhaps the most significant fact about the work of the Court in modern times is that it itself chooses the cases it will decide. For the great bulk of its jurisdiction, this discretion is expressly given the Court by statute. But even in the relatively few remaining cases where there is nominally an appeal "as of right," the Court has built an area of discretion by dismissing without hearing appeals where the federal question is deemed "insubstantial."

Some 1200 dissatisfied litigants apply to the Court annually to review decisions of lower state and federal courts. Perhaps a hundred-odd of these, in the course of a term, can be given plenary consideration and disposed of with full opinion. With bemusing regularity, about half of the annual grist of applications for review come to the Court in the summer. Often they are sent out to the Justices on vacation, and one wonders whether they followed Justice Douglas this summer to fabled Samarkand.

The first business of the Court upon its return to Washington is to decide which of these cases it will decide. Except where one may disqualify himself, all nine Justices participate in discussion and vote on each application. Meanwhile, cases of which review was granted last spring, but too late to permit argument last term, are ready to be heard. Some 20 of these have been set down for argument and even in this small sample, cases dealing with the actions of state and national governments in pursuit of security, real or fancied, against internal Communism bulk large; and they may be expected to bulk large throughout the term. In the first two weeks, the Court will consider the discharge of a Brooklyn College professor, an employee of the City of New York, for his refusal on grounds of possible self-incrimination to tell a United States Senate Subcommittee



whether he was a member of the Communist Party in 1940-41. It will hear an attack on the constitutional validity of a system of parole-like supervision, set up by Act of Congress and administrative orders and regulations, for certain aliens awaiting deportation. In this particular case, the offense subjecting the aliens to deportation was membership in the Communist Party after their entry into the United States.

Not far behind, though not yet scheduled for argument, is the conviction of Steve Nelson under the Pennsylvania "little Smith Act," of which review was also granted last spring. The question raised here is whether Congress, in passing the federal law, "occupied the field" so as to displace state laws directed to the same problem. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court thought so, but the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in its prosecuting arm is not satisfied with the answer.

Still further in the wings, with the application for review not yet granted, though almost certainly it will be, is the case which may test the constitutionality of the elaborate machinery of the Subversive Activities Control Board.

To most Americans who follow the work of the Court these cases seem inevitably to call for the resolution of major Constitutional issues. It takes some sophistication to see, however, that the Court will not take our political queries neat. Submitted for *judicial* decision, the problems suffer a sea change into something different and, to the layman, strange. The cases come to the Court and are decided within the frame of process and method which has been worked out over centuries. This frame is simply not adapted to producing the clear-cut, no-bones-about-it answers which many of us expect from the Court. Some of those who have thought deeply about the question say this is just as well: it is only this refraction which makes tolerable the exercise of the power we have given our Court.

In any event, the frame is there, modifying, shaping, sometimes controlling decision. It exists to some extent even for those who would most be free of it. For it is part of their professional training, part of the way they have learned to think. We may see its operation when some of the cases mentioned above are decided, for in at least two, the New York teacher case and the alien parole case, the procedural contest is such as to raise doubts whether the Court will reach the constitutional issues tendered.

One may dismiss these strictures of legal method as the lawyer's professional parochialism. But Justice Holmes, who decided or dissented in his share of great cases, warned against the "great case" on broader grounds. These cases are called great, he reminds us,

> because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well-settled principles of law will bend.

Wise decision is not the product of an atmosphere of pressure. But wise or not, a constitutional decision, once rendered, is remarkably difficult to unmake. *Plessey* v. *Ferguson*, with its separate-but-equal doctrine, was sixty years in the undoing. Those who have followed the work of the Court in recent years, have seen too much of this hydraulic pressure at work to take Holmes' warning lightly.

ABRAHAM CHAYES

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That Dangerous Mr. Hutchins

His kind of Americanism program doesn't appeal to the American Legion

by Walter Goodman

WHEN THE autumn winds rush against the tops of New York City's high buildings these brisk days, hanging fluorescent tubes sway in the brand-new Fund for the Republic offices on the fifty-fifth floor of an East Forty-Second street building. Despite some early uneasiness among those who work under the swinging lights, they are now taken for granted and ignored. Other winds also have beset the Fund for the Republic. Blown by the American Legion in its Miami Convention they are reaching gale force. These also the Fund takes for granted and expects to weather.

In appropriating a million dollars to set up the Fund for the Republic in 1951, the trustees of the Ford Foundation believed they were forwarding one of their original aims—"to support activities directed toward the elimination of restrictions on freedom of thought, inquiry and expression in the United States. . . ."

In February, 1953, the Fund was granted $14 million and the cord that had tied it to the Ford Foundation was severed. The Ford Company was eager to be disconnected from figures as controversial as Robert Hutchins and Paul Hoffman. In turn the Eisenhower Republicans who took over were equally eager to set in motion a program to restore respect for traditional American freedoms. Respect for civil liberties was not flourishing, and this group of conservatives started in full operation a program designed to refresh the national concern for the rights of the nonconformists. Paul G. Hoffman is Chairman of the Board and Board members include Arthur H. Dean, head of Sullivan and Cromwell; William H. Joyce, Jr., chairman of the board of Joyce, Inc.; Meyer Kestnbaum, president of Hart, Schaffner & Marx and a member of the Hoover Commission; C. Albert Linton of the Provident Mutual Life Insurance Co.; the distinguished attorney, John Lord O'Brian; J. R. Parten, Woodley Petroleum Co.; public opinion analyst Elmo Roper; and James D. Zellerbach, of Crown Zellerbach Corporation.

The Board of Directors of the newly independent offspring decided to concentrate on five areas of study: restrictions and assaults upon academic freedom; due process and equal protection of the laws; the protection of the rights of minorities; censorship, boycotting and blacklisting by private groups; and the principle of guilt by association and its application in America today.

As Dr. Hutchins explained, the Fund was not interested in scholarship as such, nor in general education. "Its efforts are focused on the immediate issues of civil liberties. When it engages in research, or sponsors it, the Fund is seeking to obtain answers to questions that are pressing now."

Precisely this seeking has been the cause of profound disquiet in the bosoms of such like-minded persons as Legion Commander Seaborn P. Collins, Fulton Lewis Jr., Sen. John W. Bricker, and Rep. B. Carroll Reece. In the report of his special House committee to investigate the tax-exempt foundations, Congressman Reece spoke darkly of "subversion" and "socialism." Senator Bricker —a legislator adored by some Legion higher-ups—thinks that the Fund's "purpose in life is to criticize those who are critical of Communists." Mr. Lewis has been saying pretty much the same thing nightly since August 22.

As for Commander Collins, he has convinced the Legion, and now wants the Congress to confirm, that Dr. Hutchins is trying with tax-exempt funds to dupe Americans into believing that:

> Communism never has been and is not now a serious danger to this country;
>
> Sinister forces under the pretext of fighting Communism are the real danger, and threaten the civil liberties of all Americans;
>
> Security measures are un-American and are being used to harass and persecute innocent people;
>
> Intelligent and educated people are aware of these things but are opposed by the ignorant who are being misled by evil demagogues.

The sources of the displeasure of the American Legion's head are open for all to inspect in the annual report of the Fund issued in May. It has distributed two books by Telford Taylor and Alan Barth that are sharply critical of recent Congressional investigations. It has distributed film copies of the Murrow-Oppenheimer TV interview and copies of a speech by Harry P. Cain. More serious, it gave $5,000 to a Quaker library in Pennsylvania for hiring Mrs. Mary Knowles, even though she had invoked the Fifth Amendment. These minor grants the Congress may well resent. A larger grant was the

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$50,000 given to the American Bar Foundation to carry out studies on "individual rights as affected by national security." The American Friends Service Committee was allotted $150,000 "for a two-year program of support in legal cases to strengthen the right to freedom of conscience." One hundred thousand dollars went to the Association of the Bar of the City of New York Fund, Inc. for a study of the federal loyalty-security program. The Southern Regional Council received $240,000 "for education in intergroup relations in 12 states."

The largest grant given since the establishment of the Fund has been $300,000 "for an account of Communist influence in major segments of US society." Other studies include: "Blacklisting in Private Industry"; "Fear in Education"; and the problem of over-all censorship. The organizations which have received grants from the Fund so far include: The American Library Association; the Catholic Inter-racial Council of Chicago; the Waverly, Iowa, Chamber of Commerce; Columbia University; Cornell University; the Congregational Church; the New York Public Library; the YMCA and the YWCA.

This is the record now under assault from the Legion. Like many previous Legion onslaughts, the public attack served to herald in the Legion's annual convention which met in Miami from October 10 to 13. The need for this sort of ear-splitting announcement in 1955 was especially urgent. It is no secret that the American Legion lost half a million members between 1947 and 1950; returning veterans from Korea bolstered its ranks, but now it is on the way down again. To add to the concern of the entrenched leaders, a series of rebellions have occurred yearly since 1948 when insurgent World War II veterans came close to electing as their national commander a man who hadn't been previously picked by the existing powers. Just last year the national executive committee of the Forty & Eight, the Legion's fun-making adjunct, bitterly denounced the back room rulers of the parent body.

Commander Collins

For the past seven years the Legion has been dominated by a very few men, notably Jim Ringley, an Illinois banker and Maurice Stember, a full-time legionnaire from New York. In company with a handful of other bigwigs from influential states like California and Pennsylvania, these men meet each May and choose the national commander who will be elected the following September. By the time this article appears, J. Addington Wagner of Battle Creek, Michigan, will have been overwhelmingly and spontaneously elevated by his fellows in Miami. In 1956 the cloak is destined to fall on W. C. (Dan) Daniels, a Virginian. And so it goes.

The choice of Wagner as commander is of special interest. He comes to his high office from the vice chairmanship of the Americanism Committee, whose full-time chairman is Lee Pennington. Pennington, an FBI agent for 25 years, is thought to have persuaded Collins—normally a quiet, amiable fellow who has stayed clear of controversy during his year in office—to take out after the Fund for the Republic. Pennington is said to keep in touch with his old boss J. Edgar Hoover, who recently made an unusually strong speech against those, like the Fund for the Republic, who have been criticizing the use of secret informers. Whatever pressures moved Commander Collins to attack the Fund, they were strong enough to cause Legion policy planners to think in terms of a boycott on Ford cars.

The Americanism committee has traditionally shouldered the heaviest of the Legion's patriotic chores. It fought for the Bricker Amendment; it led the offensive against the Girl Scouts; it condemned UNESCO several years in a row. Rather embarrassingly, in the midst of the latest condemnation proceedings, another group of legionnaires—a special committee headed by Ray Murphy—concluded that UNESCO was not Communistic; it was not even atheistic. Murphy, former national commander and a major figure in the Legion, wrote out his report in long hand, after 18 months of study. He is reported stunned by the abusive mail he subsequently received.

Another embarrassing incident occurred in Illinois where past State Commander Irving Breakstone brought his dissatisfaction with the national leadership into the open when he deplored Commander Collins' denunciation of the Fund and commended it for its assistance to the Legion's Education for Freedom program in Illinois. But Mr. Breakstone and the members of his Chicago post are looked on as mavericks by their fellows, and the former state commander's actions have already been repudiated by the Illinois executive committee.

At the Fund, the Legion attack is taken as a good measure of the effect of the work done. The recent publication of *Case Studies in Personnel Security*, made by a staff of young Washington lawyers, and Rowland Watts' survey of "undesirable" discharges of draftees for their pre-induction activities or associations, have revealed two chambers of horrors to the public gaze. The analysis now under way at the Stanford University Law School of the testimony of witnesses in the Communist investigations should open up a messy closet at least. It is no wonder that those who nurtured and have profited by the national security psychosis have been goaded into counter-action.

But the Fund's planners have been in fights before; indeed Dr. Hutchins has the reputation of seeking them out. Only one morale-boosting trophy hangs in his new office on 42nd street. It reads: "Chicago Post No. 170, The American Legion, gratefully awards this Certificate of Appreciation to Robert Maynard Hutchins in recognition of distinguished service. . . ."

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The unavailability of candidate Eisenhower puts Democratic hopes in new perspective

1956—Return to Normalcy?

by Angus Campbell

AS THE PERIOD of grave danger passes for President Eisenhower and his recovery seems assured, discussion turns naturally to the Presidential succession after 1956. Republican leaders claim, of course, that their party's prospects will be unaltered by the President's retirement. Democrats maintain, as they must, that they will regain the Presidency next November.

The article which follows is based upon a comprehensive program of research, undertaken over four years, by an independent and objective organization, the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan. In contrast to the polls conducted by newspapers which rely on a short ballot of candidates and choices, the Center bases its research on hour-long interviews aimed at understanding the complicated interplay of forces that govern American politics. In further contrast to the interviews with selected citizens, which partially accounted for the errors made by newspaper polls in 1948, the interviews conducted by the Center are chosen at random.

THE HEART attack which sent Mr. Eisenhower to a Denver hospital has given dramatic emphasis to the importance which Republicans and Democrats alike attach to the President's candidacy in 1956. The extent to which the Republican leadership have been depending on Mr. Eisenhower to lead their ticket in next year's election is now even more evident than it was before his illness. The Democrats are hardly less explicit in their interest in whether the President will or will not be a candidate.

November, 1956, is still a long time away as political time is measured. No one can know what may happen to alter the political picture between now and then. We do know a good deal, however, about the elections of 1952 and 1954 and this may tell us something of the factors that will be important in 1956.

Mr. Eisenhower was elected in 1952 because a large number of former Democratic voters deserted their party and cast their votes for him. It was not the so-called independent voters or the young voters who elected Mr. Eisenhower, although both these groups gave him a respectable majority. It was the millions of Democrats who had voted for Truman in 1948 and then swung to Eisenhower in 1952; without them the General could not have won.

It is an insufficiently appreciated fact that no Republican candidate for President has much chance of winning unless he does succeed in stimulating a major Democratic defection. This is true because Democrats greatly outnumber Republicans, something near the ratio of three to two.

For the Republicans to win, one of two things must happen. Either the potential Democratic voters stay home in large numbers while the Republicans go to the polls, or the Republicans mobilize their own party vote and capture a significant number from the Democrats. In 1948 a large number of apathetic or discontented Democrats did stay home from the polls, but Mr. Truman was saved by the fact that a good many Republicans also failed to vote. In 1952 the total turnout was 25 percent larger, but the Democratic Party could not hold its membership in line. These defectors hold the key to the decision in 1956.

No one knows precisely why so many Democrats broke over to the Republican candidate in 1952, but we know in general terms at least what some of the major factors were. From the intensive study of the 1952 election carried out by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan three facts stand out.

First and most important, the electorate did not believe that the Democratic Party and its candidate had an answer to the Korean War. The intolerable frustration which was felt across the nation over the Korean stalemate was again reflected in a Survey Research Center study done in October, 1954. When asked what they felt was "the best thing" the Republican Administration had done in its two years of office, the only answer which was given by any significant proportion of the sample (28 percent) was that it had ended the Korean War.

Angus Campbell, professor of social psychology and director of the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan, is author of The Voter Decides *(Roe-Peterson, Evanston, Ill., 1954).*

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The second factor was the variously expressed feeling that the Democratic Administration in Washington was showing signs of having been too long in office. The third factor was the peculiar juxtaposition of personalities which existed in the 1952 campaign. Mr. Eisenhower obviously began the campaign with a tremendous advantage over any Democratic candidate who might have been nominated. His name was a household word. Not only was he known but he was known in the very area which weighed most heavily on the public mind, the solution of foreign conflict. The public image of Stevenson, in contrast, bore no relevance to the Korean situation. While there was relatively little criticism of Stevenson among the electorate, there was not widespread perception of him as a person peculiarly suited to the times.

With these considerations in mind, what conclusions can we draw regarding 1956? The primary fact again is that the Democrats will start with a clear advantage in the number of their party followers. Repeated surveys have shown that the proportions of people who call themselves Democrats or Republicans have not changed since before Mr. Eisenhower took office. It is significant that even those Democrats who voted for Eisenhower in 1952 still identify themselves with the Democratic Party. The General captured their votes in 1952, but he did not convert them to the Republican Party.

The situation which these voters will face in 1956 will differ in at least two respects from 1952. Most importantly there will be no Korean War. If we assume that no new conflict is blazing a year from now, we must conclude that domestic issues will play a proportionately greater role in 1956 than they did in 1952. Less important perhaps is the fact that the "time for a change" motivation will have lost its force. The sins of the Democratic regime will have faded a little into the past and the record of the Republican Administration will be the subject of scrutiny.

THE 1954 election gives us a partial preview of how the voters may react to this new situation. The striking thing about the vote pattern in 1954 was its tendency to return to the pattern of 1948. For example, young voters who had favored Eisenhower by a moderate majority were back strongly in the Democratic camp where they had been in 1948. Catholics, who split about equally for President in 1952, gave Democratic Congressmen a majority in 1954 but not the two-to-one edge they had given Truman in 1948. Farmers, who went heavily for Eisenhower, came back to an even split in 1954 although not to the level of support they had given Truman. White-collar workers also dropped from a substantial Eisenhower preference to about the even division they had shown in 1948. Union members increased their Democratic majority over their 1952 record but not to their 1948 level. The shift of votes to Eisenhower which occurred in nearly all social classes in 1952 appears to have receded all along the line in 1954, although not entirely to the 1948 level. The aggregate result was a 52-percent Democratic majority in the popular vote and a Democratic Congress.

How are we to explain this drift away from the Republican majority of 1952? It does not appear to have been inspired by any great national issue that moved the electorate. When asked what they thought was the "worst thing" the Republican Administration had done in its two years in office, those questioned in the Survey Research Center sample in October, 1954, mentioned the "mishandling of McCarthy" more frequently (13 percent) than any other presumed misdeed. Interestingly enough, Republican voters were twice as likely to make this particular criticism as Democratic. Other nominations for "worst thing," such as farm policy, unemployment, income-tax bill and desegregation were all five percent or less in number. Specific issues may have had local significance in particular areas, as the public-power issue apparently had in the state of Oregon, but national issues did not dominate the 1954 campaign.

THE Democratic victory in 1954 can most conservatively be attributed to the reassertion of the natural majority which the Democratic Party enjoys in this country. Some remnants of the Republican gains from the Democratic following still remained in 1954 but not enough to overcome the total number of Democrats who voted with their party. Without the issues which hurt the Democrats in 1952 and in an election in which the influence of personalities tended to balance out, the Republican Party was in a weak position. Even in a light turnout (42 million), which is ordinarily favorable to their ticket, they were outnumbered.

The lesson of 1954 is that the Republican Party cannot at the present hold a national majority without the aid of some major issue which is damaging to the opposition or of an outstanding candidate whose personal appeal is clearly superior to that of his opponent.

It is difficult to believe that domestic issues in 1956 will be more favorable to the Republican Party than they were in 1952. The Republican position on such questions as public power, public housing and farm-price supports is not calculated to arouse mass enthusiasm of the kind that might bring large numbers of voters to the polls or lure them away from their traditional party attachment. The issues of corruption and Communists-in-government cannot be expected to have the bite they had in 1952. The Republicans will undoubtedly hope to make political profit from the economic prosperity the country has enjoyed during their Administration. But the country was relatively prosperous before the Republicans took office, and it is not clear how the electorate will respond to a condition which they may now regard as a normal state of affairs.

Foreign affairs may be a different story. If foreign affairs remain non-belligerent but continue to be a source of public exasperation and disappointment, they will

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hardly present a partisan issue since, at the executive level at least, the policies of the present and preceding administrations do not differ significantly. In the happy event that the recent Geneva conferences lead to a spectacular decline in East-West tension the Republicans would, of course, be in a position to make political capital from their foreign policies.

The crucial unknown in the political formula for 1956 is obviously President Eisenhower. If the President recovers sufficiently from his heart ailment to stand for re-election, he would unquestionably strengthen the Republican ticket, perhaps decisively, as many politicians and commentators seem to believe. If he decides to retire to his Gettysburg farm, the Republican Party will face the difficult problem of replacing him with a candidate who can give their ticket the same kind of lift Mr. Eisenhower gave it in 1952.

Mr. Eisenhower's personal qualities undoubtedly influenced the vote in 1952, but it cannot be believed that that election was decided solely on the basis of his personal appeal. It was a combination of the man and the hour. Our only other evidence of his vote-getting abilities comes from the 1954 election. While the President was not a very active campaigner in that election his preferences were clear, and it is significant that they were rejected by the electorate. It is highly unusual for the party that holds the White House to lose both houses of Congress in the off-year election.

The public image of Mr. Eisenhower can best be understood as a multiple image. As a person, he is widely seen as warm, friendly and attractive. This image seems to be almost non-controversial. As the national leader in international affairs he is seen as experienced, capable, and trustworthy. In the realm of domestic politics, however, the image is much less clear. The Survey Research Center study in 1952 made it apparent that the electorate in that year did not see Mr. Eisenhower as a man who had any special abilities in domestic affairs; they were much more interested in his international experience. It seems probable that this is still the prevailing view. The manner in which the President has conducted himself in his period in office has tended to remove him somewhat from party struggles over domestic issues and it would be surprising if people generally saw him as closely identified with specific domestic programs.

It is not to be expected that any candidate put forward by the Republicans in the event of the President's retirement can equal his personal appeal or his stature in international affairs. Without these attributes can a successor to the Republican nomination hold the tremendous vote which Mr. Eisenhower attracted in 1952? In all probability he could hold those voters whose party attachments are normally Republican. The question is whether he could hold the normally Democratic voters who supported Mr. Eisenhower in 1952. If as many as half these voters shifted back to the Democratic Party, the Republican majority would be in jeopardy. Any loss among the independent or young voters would then prove fatal.

The Future of Africa—II

by Colin Legum

WITH the exception of the Sudan, countries which since the First World War have achieved their independence, or made important steps in that direction, have succeeded only after strenuous political action, often colored by violence. Must we face the prospect that significant political changes in Africa will come about only after bitter, even violent, struggles; and through the process of the "politics of crisis"?

The crucial question is: when does a colonial power decide that the time has come to "abdicate" some or all of its power? Hitherto Europe has been interested in Africa mainly for these closely related reasons: to exploit Africa for the advantage of Europe; to help Africa for its own sake, and with an eye to its future relations with Europe. The old type of colonial exploitation is no longer possible except in a limited number of countries. In Britain the idea of imperialism is dead. Neither the Conservatives nor the Socialists want it revived. The real argument between them turns on timing—on how fast colonial emancipation should proceed—and on the question: into whose hands, in a plural society, should power be transferred.

The colonial powers must now decide what they want to achieve in the time that still remains to them to play an effective role in Africa. Do they wish to try to maintain effective control for as long as they can? Or do they account the important task the creation of such conditions as will permit Western influence to be freely accepted even after they cease to exercise effective control?

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While it is not possible to maintain control without effective power, it is possible to exercise influence without power. It is possible, however, to lose influence even though retaining power through superior force. This is perhaps best illustrated by the example of the South African Government, which although it retains complete power has lost its ability to influence the Africans. On the other hand, British influence in Pakistan, India and Ceylon has not been significantly weakened since the transfer of power.

If we can agree that the ultimate purpose of the colonial powers is to ensure that the West shall continue to influence Africa, even after it is no longer possible to exercise direct control, then we can judge when the transfer of power is wise and statesmanlike, and when it is an act of weakness, of surrender.

But who decides when transfer of power is likely to achieve the one result rather than the other?

Britain and France are the two colonial powers most immediately concerned in Africa with the problem of transferring power. Britain has transferred power to two different groups. In West Africa and the Sudan political power has been handed over to the Africans, while in Central Africa and Kenya greater power has been given to the White settlers than to the Africans.

France, too, has granted internal autonomy in French North Africa. But political power remains firmly entrenched in the hands of the French Government and the settlers; it has not met the demands of the indigenous populations for an effective voice in policy-making (as current disturbances prove), although some progress has recently been made in Tunisia.

The consequences that flow from these divergent policies are important. In West Africa the situation is quiet, and co-operation between Britain and the African elite has never been better. In North Africa there is violence and mounting hostility. In Central Africa there is a simmering crisis. And in Kenya, violence.

Two conclusions may be drawn. First, it is easier to transfer power in those countries which are not plagued with the problems of a plural society. And second, the transfer of power into the hands of the White settlers—whatever its purpose—does not produce peaceful conditions. South Africa is the outstanding proof of this assertion.

The only relatively peaceful plural society in Africa is Tanganyika. It is the only country where political power is gradually being transferred to all three races—Africans, Asians and Whites—on the basis of equal shares.

Let us try and see this problem through the eyes of an African.

He sees Britain conferring greater political power on Africans in the Gold Coast and Nigeria, and granting independence to the Sudan. At the same time he sees Britain increasing the political power of the White settlers in Central Africa and Kenya, and not in Tanganyika. To add to his bafflement he sees Britain maintaining close and friendly relations with South Africa, whose Government has nailed its flag firmly to the mast of White supremacy. Because South Africa objects to mixed marriages, Britain obliges by kicking Seretse Khama out of Bechuanaland. South Africa's Defense Minister meets with British Army chiefs in regular conferences to plan the defense strategy of Africa, and publicly boasts of his influence in these conferences. Yet his Government's policy is that Africans should not be armed. Perhaps the African reminds himself that Britain maintains close and friendly relations also with India, Pakistan and Ceylon: three non-White nations which have secured their national independence, and strongly oppose South African policies. Also Britain has refused to hand over the three High Commission territories—Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland—to Dr. Malan's Government. It is all so very, very confusing.

South Africa is part of the multi-racial Commonwealth of Nations. It is into this Commonwealth that Britain hopes to bring all its colonies once they have achieved independence. Will South Africa's opposition nullify this intention? Do Africans wish to belong to a Commonwealth which permits one of its members to deny political rights to non-Whites? Every attempt to solve the constitutional problems of the plural society, or to increase the speed of industrialization, is received with anxious questions: "Will our country be turned into a second South Africa? Will this bring in more settlers? Will they get greater political control? Will they seek to dominate us like the settlers of South Africa dominate their non-White peoples?"

Africa is a naturally suspicious continent: in the past every man has felt his neighbor's hand to be threateningly against him; the forests make for suspicion; the slave trade has seared the unconscious mind; the part played by the imperialist powers has inevitably caused Africans to view all change as being motivated by selfish interests; the security of tribal society and the power of familiar magic have weakened or destroyed.

The long association in Africa between Whites and Africans (and Asians) has not diminished their fear and suspicions of each other. In the old days Boer, Briton and Bantu used the rifle and the spear to settle their differences. The Bantu, afraid of losing his land, was quick to defend himself; and the Whites, afraid for their precarious position in their new homeland, were ready to anticipate attack. The old-fashioned horse commandos have given way to the modern idea of defense through the battalions of White nationalism. And the old warrior *impis* have fashioned a new weapon, borrowed from the West: Black nationalism. The Bishop

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of Mombasa recently described African nationalism as the "atom bomb of Africa." We have seen what the conflict of nationalisms has done in Europe: what will be its effect in Africa?

Failure by the colonial powers to state unequivocally their fundamental purpose in Africa, and to back their words by consistent practice, has seriously blurred the outline of the Western "mission." The West speaks in Africa with a multitude of voices.

Dr. Malan's Nationalist Government of South Africa says it is the "outpost of Western civilization"; it defines its aim as "maintaining Western traditions by ensuring the survival of White supremacy." The Christian missionaries proclaim the need to convert Africa to the true Church which recognizes the "brotherhood of all men." The British administrators constantly assert that their duty is to help establish Western institutions and to train Africans to operate these institutions so that they may be capable of "running their own show."

WHAT must the African believe? Which is the authentic voice of the West? The administrator from Whitehall, or the White settler who wages a ceaseless campaign to "break the stranglehold of Whitehall?" The Bishop of Johannesburg who preaches brotherhood, or Dr. Malan who preaches the race supremacy? The Governor of Uganda who "despises anything that smacks of the color bar," or the British Protectorate government of Northern Rhodesia which, over the years, has permitted a rigid color bar to grow up in the Copperbelt?

So long as the pace of change in Africa was that of the ox-wagon, and so long as there were few educated leaders and practically no African newspapers, the West could "get away with" a policy of expediency. But that is no longer possible. Africa is no longer a continent of hermit communities. The elite are politically conscious; and this is true not only of the Africans but also of the Whites and of the Asians. The outbreak of Mau Mau in Kenya, for example, was one of the major questions exploited by Dr. Malan's Nationalist Party during the 1953 general election campaign.

The White inhabitants of Africa—and the Asians—have chosen to make their homes there, and many who have dwelt in the continent for generations have rights as precious to them as those cherished by the Africans. For all the mischief that settlers at some time or another have caused, the record of achievement of the immigrant races justifies the role they have played in Africa. They are the spark plugs that have ignited the dynamo of change in Africa; and for this, if for nothing else, they deserve both the gratitude and hospitality of the continent. The Whites and the Asians still have a great role to play. And they are entitled, as a matter of right, to expect that their claim to security in Africa should be protected to the hilt.

The Whites are seriously disturbed about the trend of events, and they react differently to them according to where they live and the attitude to which they have been conditioned.

To malign the White man in Africa simply because he is White is contemptible. Moreover, it is harmful both to the West and to Africa. And the first to admit this will be the African. There needs to be added one qualification: the White man must justify himself by his contribution and his behavior. So long as he does nothing to hold up the progress of Africa; so long as he is prepared to work on terms acceptable to the African as well as himself, so long is he a valuable, perhaps an indispensable, factor in the continent.

What is intolerable is that Whites or Asians should seek to maintain themselves at the expense of Africans; or that they should be guilty of racial arrogance and of *herrenvolkism*. This behavior Africa will not tolerate for ever. It will wreak a bitter revenge and the losers will be Whites, Asians and the Africans.

When Asia split asunder its colonial bonds more than half of it threw in its lot with the Communist bloc, another quarter is still uneasily perched between West and East; and less than a quarter is firmly orientated toward the West. This same process is now under way in Africa.

So far, the Communists have failed to make any major converts among the African states. But the policy of calculated neutrality is winning ground. The next 10 years will be decisive.

African nationalist leaders are, not surprisingly, profoundly interested in the behavior of American leaders. John Foster Dulles' speeches on Asian affairs; the votes of the United States at UN; the policies of the major American foundations; the reports of distinguished visitors like Adlai Stevenson, Chester Bowles and John Gunther—all these are carefully studied and discussed in newspaper articles and speeches. America's behavior in Asia and in North Africa is regarded by African leaders as having the same significance for their own countries as it has for the Far Eastern and Mediterranean peoples.

IN A very real sense, therefore, Western policy can be said to be indivisible. As the senior partner in the Western Alliance the United States cannot escape the consequences of the policies of its British, French, Belgian, Portuguese and Spanish allies in Africa. It is this judgment that makes it so vitally important that the United States—no less than the Colonial powers—should formulate, and would be seen to pursue, a coherent and enlightened policy in Africa. On its present record the United States has not yet proven to the African leaders that it can be relied on to support their interests when these conflict with the privileges of the *colonnes* in North Africa or of the settlers in Kenya, Central Africa or South Africa.

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The Superficial Aspect

The Bull-Headed Minority

The sudden removal of President Eisenhower from the campaign picture of next year has thrown upon the Republican strategists a burden that may break their collective back as a responsible political party. They are facing the ancient Israelites' problem of making bricks without straw which, in the old days, precipitated an exodus and may do so again.

Normally, an American political party may hope to make a successful appeal to the country on any one of three issues—its own good record, its opponents' bad record, or an irresistible candidate. In 1952 the Republicans had no record of their own, and while they vigorously exploited every mistake of their opponents they could not make that record look very bad; but they had the irresistible candidate, and with him they won the White House and a precarious hold on the Capitol.

Every consideration of political prudence dictated use of the opportunity to reinforce the candidate by making a good record of their own in the 83rd Congress; but instead they wasted the time in squabbles between the McCarthy wing and the Eisenhower wing, while the amazed and delighted Democrats merely looked on. By this folly they lost Congress in 1954, and so have no chance to make a record of their own in the coming year.

Now sardonic fate has stepped in and eliminated the irresistible candidate. Of the three ordinarily winning issues, therefore, only one remains, to wit, some folly on the part of the Democrats so gross that it will throw the election to the Republicans automatically.

Historically this might be deemed no bad hope since, when it comes to asininity at a critical juncture the Democratic Party has a record surpassed by none. At this moment, however, two considerations operate against acceptance of the theory that they will do it again. In the first place, it is hard to see what idiocy they could commit that would be blatant enough to shock the country into voting against them. In the second place the strategists now in control of the party, notably Sen. Lyndon Johnson and Speaker Rayburn, have so well demonstrated the effectiveness of suave politeness that the understrappers will hesitate to discard it. As long as his system is working beautifully, even a Democrat has sense enough not to switch to another.

Discontent in the farm belt and a sagging stock market added to Republican woes in the early fall, but their real trouble stems from the lost opportunity in the 83rd Congress. If party discipline had been promptly and firmly established in the first 90 days of the new Administration, McCarthy might have been squelched and Knowland brought into line before either had done much damage; instead of which the situation was allowed to get so completely out of hand that for a time nobody knew who was the real power in Washington. In the circumstances a consistent and intelligent legislative program was out of the question; not until the Democrats regained control of the Capitol did Eisenhower get anything like a free hand.

Even now the country's expectation that there will be no drastic change of policy, especially in the field of foreign relations, rests more upon the proved steadiness of the Democrats than upon any hope that the Republicans will become a cohesive and coherent party. The general assumption is that if the applecart is upset, the McCarthyites will do it, not the technical opponents of the President.

In retrospect the record is one of political ineptitudes not to be matched since the Democratic Party under Pierce and Buchanan allowed their wild men to get out of hand and invite, indeed, insist upon the destruction of the whole party. The underlying error is the same—a stubborn refusal on the part of one vociferous element of the party to recognize the fact that changing circumstances impose changing responsibilities on government.

In the one case it was the collapse of the moral position of slavery as a tolerated institution; in the other, it is the collapse of the physical power of the British empire to protect the United States from the storms that beat upon any nation occupying a leading position in the world. Both occurrences were inevitable, but in both instances it pleased a certain group of politicians to deny that the event affected in any way the responsibilities of this nation. The nation has suffered precisely to the extent that their influence was dominant.

Well, it all goes to support the observation of every clear-headed student of politics from Machiavelli down—while corrupt and evil-disposed rulers are an affliction and a curse, if you wish to produce ruin and devastation in a really big way, you should look around, not for a Nero, but for a group of rulers who don't know how to rule nor even what the real world is like, and who are too romantic, or too bull-headed ever to learn.

GERALD W. JOHNSON

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BOOKS & COMMENT

In Retrospect: Charles Beard's Liberalism

by Cushing Strout

IT IS a temptation to write of Charles Beard in the mood of piety and homage, for who else spoke with as much authority and influence for the Progressive temper in American scholarship of the past half-century? But there is an ironic incongruity in this approach to a man who made a point of scorning the "filio-pietistic" reverence for the American past. Good intentions do not justify

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making a house pet out of a tiger. Beard, after all, not only generated controversy; he enjoyed and respected it. Nor would he who had impressed upon historians the relativity of written history have been surprised to discover that time has put his own work in a new perspective.

Because his career blazed out in a passionate isolationism at the end it is also a temptation to see in him the familiar outlines of the parochial, Midwestern agrarian radical with a deep suspicion of urban, Eastern financial interests and an ingrained hostility to European culture and politics. In this glib sketch Beard is another Bryan, La Follette, or Borah, a scholarly brother to "the Sons of the Wild Jackass." Only one thing blurs this plausible portrait—the record. In 1914 Beard defended property rights as fundamental and universally sacred, condemned Wilson's attack on the trusts as being as "unreal and unattainable" as Jefferson's agrarian democracy, and defended the Supreme Court's power of judicial review against the reckless currency policies of state legislatures. In 1929 he hailed international capitalism as "the best pledge of peace" against fanatical nationalism and revolutionary Communism, and in 1935 he wrote that "the conception of America as a self-constituted, hermit-kingdom is false to the facts and the scorn that many Americans pour on the Old World is an evidence of infantilism, not of strength." The central and neglected fact about Beard is that he was not a politician, but a scholar and philosopher whose ideas need to be examined not explained away.

With a rare blend of the researcher's passion for detail and the philosopher's grandeur of vision he tried to apply the economic interpretation of history to American life. At DePauw his teacher, Col. James R. Weaver, had introduced him to Marxism, and at Oxford, where as a young graduate student he helped establish Ruskin Hall as a workingman's college, Beard wrote his first book, *The Industrial Revolution,* which prophetically reverberated with the themes that were to make him famous. By 1913 he announced in one of the most influential books of the past half-century, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution*: "The theory of economic determinism has not yet been tried out in American history, and until it is tried out, it can not be found wanting."

IN retrospect Beard's impact appears as an eloquent illustration that nothing is so powerful as an idea whose time has come. For Populists, Muckrakers, Progressives, and a whole school of historians had prepared the ground for him by heeding Turner's dictum that "behind institutions, behind constitutional forms, lie the vital forces that call those organs into life and shape them to meet changing conditions." For most of his career Beard adhered to E. R. A. Seligman's axiom, derived from Marx, that "to economic causes . . . must be traced in the last instance those transformations in the structure of society which themselves condition the relations of social classes and the various manifestations of social life." Looking backward, it seems absurd that his study of the Framers fell on the public like a bombshell, scandalizing conservatives and delighting radicals, both of whom felt that the Founding Fathers had been debunked into the Funding Fathers. This melodramatic effect was ironical for Beard aimed to view the conflict of classes "as coldly and impartially as any disciple of Ranke that the American Historical Association has furnished." For him it was idle to inquire whether "the rapacity of the creditors or the total depravity of the debtors" was responsible for the antagonism he saw behind the movement for the Constitution. His economic determinism was not a vulgar Marxism, which reduces all motivation to an economic level, but a more orthodox analysis which finds economic forces preponderant only "in the last instance," controlling the large-scale history-making conflicts.

BUT even in its subtle form, which for the most part Beard practiced in his heroically ambitious *The Rise of American Civilization,* the theory menaces historical understanding by leading the historian to seek some husk or core to history of which other events are mere offshoots. This specter of a transcendent casuality brooding over history dogmatically organizes the past in terms of a pattern which lies behind and beyond the range of empirical evidence. The complexity which the theory allows at the level of motivation is denied at the level of major social conflict, and it is thus rejected where it is most needed. Under the seductive allure of theory, the historian always finds in the end the simplicity he originally discards. Beard's history consequently minimized the political and constitutional issues of the Revolution, and discounted the moral explosiveness of slavery for the Civil War.

It is fatally easy, when economics is made *finally* important, to find it also to be *primarily* important, and so Beard fell into the vulgar Marxism he condemned. Thus the furor over his study of the Constitution had its roots in his own ambiguous argument. On one page he could warn that he was *not* trying to show that the document was made "for the personal benefit" of the Fathers; on another he could say that the members of the Convention were "immediately, directly, and personally interested in the outcome of their labors." If he was no muckraker, his theory, with its stress on the gap between appearances and realities, made him look like one, giving to his work the conspiratorial overtones which were to appear in his treatment of the 14th Amendment, World War I, and Roosevelt's foreign policy. Perhaps

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the gravest defect was that in his hands American history, indeed all history, became the monotonous dialectic of the forces of business and agriculture. This Manichaeanism not only obscures the basic unities of a liberal society, as Louis Hartz has brilliantly shown, but it also inculcates the unhistorical conclusion that in history *le plus ça change, le plus ça reste le même.*

As a cultural historian he was particularly crippled by his assumption that art, religion, and learning are "bent to the order in which they thrive and have meaning and vitality only in relation to their economic substructure." His anti-formalist "tough-mindedness" made art look like Nero's fiddling. Though he shocked the business mind, Beard shared its pragmatism in praising Bryant as "a solid citizen" and condemning Henry James for a "vague" style produced by his being "a whole generation removed from the odors of the shop." For Beard, like Parrington, reality pulsed most intensely in the market-place, and the Sage of New Milford often seemed a Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court.

Much of Beard's value of course, lay in the strategic position he occupied in the American historiographical tradition, for his rebellion helped to overthrow the late nineteenth-century dominance of racist, legalistic, antiquarian, or pseudo-scientific historical assumptions. His spirited attack on the pretensions of "scientific" historians, who promulgated laws or worshipped "cold, hard facts," also led him to modify his own determinism, for his trenchant skepticism eventually brought him to a voluntaristic theory of historical knowledge.

His reading of Croce and Mannheim produced in 1936 *The Discussion of Human Affairs* which charged that the historian picked out events and causes only by a necessary but "arbitrary mutilation" of the "seamless web" of the totality of past happenings. Since there was no all-inclusive, deterministic knowledge, no "celestial mechanics," then to rescue himself from chaos the historian was compelled to hitch his wagon to a star, making "an act of faith" that history was on "an upward gradient toward a more ideal order." Weaving through the warp of the past the weft of the future, "which he can behold only by prophetic discernment," the historian would justify his work by the accuracy of his prediction of history's course. "When it is dark enough, you can see the stars," said Beard, and what he saw was the coming of "collectivist democracy," that Archimedean point from which he would interpret the world. His lingering, unrecognized belief in the old ideals of total explanation and scientific prediction of history thus paradoxically underlay the skepticism which drove him to an arbitrary act of faith that turned the historian into a utopian astrologer. Utopia is the debtor's prison of those historians for whom history has gone bankrupt.

Beard was a Progressive in a philosophical sense, committed to the eighteenth-century theory of Progress. The hero of his first book was James Watt who symbolized man's technical power over Nature. With what innocent confidence did Beard conclude the second volume of his *Rise of American Civilization*, two years before the Depression, with a radiant "faith in the efficacy of that new and mysterious instrument of the modern mind, 'the invention of invention,' moving from one technological triumph to another . . . conjuring from the vasty deeps of the nameless and unknown creative imagination" that was to be "the dawn, and not the dusk of the gods"! This technocratic utopian rationalism was the "tender-minded" other side of his "tough-minded" empiricism, a paradoxical vein that also runs deep in the other founders of the New School in New York, Veblen, Dewey, Robinson, and Barnes. When F.D.R. invented the New Deal, Beard felt that at last the spirits had been called from the deep. Enthusiastically he drew up a "Five-Year Plan" for a controlled economy, which even led Henry Wallace to accuse him of having an academic conception of the Good Life. Like Herbert Croly, Beard was a devout believer in "The Promise of American Life" which he defined as "the economy of abundance."

History seemed headed for Beard's goal when the war loomed. Though he had supported Wilson in 1917 and condemned the early revisionist historians for forgetting the balance of power in the pursuit of heroes and villains. By 1943 the Nye Committee had convinced him that the President "avoided an immediate domestic crash by leading the country into war." Thus even in his book *against* "the devil theory of war," he was concocting one, and by 1938 it seemed to him clear that F.D.R. would destroy Beard's devout dream of a "national garden well tended," withdrawn from "the hateful conflicts of passionate acquisition in Europe and the Orient," by plunging the country into a Pacific War. Had not F.D.R. an ancestor in the China trade, had he not been in the Navy Department when imperialism had flourished, was not Churchill, his partner in world politics, an empire worshipper? So Beard, with his act of faith, his myth of Progress, and his penchant for economic explanations, became, in his last two books indicting Roosevelt, entangled in the unhistorical simplicities of a conspiratorial thesis, that nemesis of utopians, as K. R. Popper has noted. For what can explain the failure to produce their heaven but "the evil intentions of the devil who has a vested interest in hell"?

The anti-formalist Progressive temper had not prepared him for the world of ideological conflict, and in 1934 he could brush off the "ethics and verbal flourishes" of Bolshevism and Fascism on the ground that the pursuit of mass prosperity meant that "all European society was more nearly assimilated in substantial matters to that of the United States." By 1945, forced to revise *The Economic Basis of Politics* to recognize the end of Economic Man in Europe, he stressed the qualification that power followed property only in free societies where political and military tyranny had no foothold. But his support of the America Firsters showed that he had not fully come to terms with the modern historical world.

If Beard made mistakes, they were on a big scale, like the man himself, and teach us more than the timid truths of mediocre minds. If we cannot accept his answers, we cannot escape his questions. The terms of his problems are ours. We too must authenticate historical knowledge while acknowledging the historian's involvement in history; we too must face the radically secular challenge of history with its man-made destiny as demanding as any theological version of man's fate. We too will need most of all what Beard possessed in an abundance that should humble us—intellectual courage. The self-examination of American Liberalism, too long confused with Progressivism, might well begin with thoughtful scrutiny of the Beardian case.

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A Matter of Fact

by Cashenden Cass

THERE recently occurred on the English radio a talk by St. John Ervine called "Portrait of H. G. Wells." Mr. Ervine, having out-stayed many of his distinguished contemporaries, has become quite a hand at re-assembling their personalities and adjudicating their literary values; his sole credential for so doing is that he is alive and they are not. Fortunately he is not the only man of his age who can claim this distinction, for it would be sad if his indulgence in the act of personal criticism of those with whom he was acquainted could pass uncorrected. His literary judgments are not so serious as his personal ones because his merit as a literary critic can only be supported by the quality of his writing; and no one is likely to be nauseated by the writing of Oscar Wilde just because St. John Ervine, making a literary judgment, says he should be. But in talk about the men who write the books it is, both for those individuals and for those who admire them, often the little things that hurt. In St. John Ervine's "Portrait of H. G. Wells" there are a lot of such little things. They savor of malice and of judgments being handed down by a person who does not seem to realize he is only in a position to hand upwards. Inaccurate belittling of each other among the members of a literary group is natural, rather painful, but usually forgettable. Done in secure retrospection it is much more harmful and the distaste lingers on.

Heritage, by Anthony West (Random House; $3.75).

The reason I mention St. John Ervine here is not irrelevant because clearly the important purpose of Anthony West's new novel *Heritage* is to put down any such misrepresentation that a survivalist like Ervine can give to a writer like Wells, and to show how it is possible to correct the many wrong impressions that might have accrued around any gifted man who seems to have been born an awkward size for the unimaginative range of society's stock fittings. The author succeeds extremely well in presenting the misfit in reasonable dress.

The information about the author at the end of this book does not claim any coincidence of relationship between Mr. West and Mr. Wells. It confines itself to numbering the author's wives. So I will confine myself to remarking that the character given the name Max Town who dominates *Heritage*, if he is not Mr. West's Portrait of H. G. Wells, well, he is the spittin' image. The novel is the story of a successful writer of genius and a successful actress of genius who have a son together but not a marriage ceremony. The story is told by the son, with a tolerant implication that such relationships are not nearly as destructive as the Text Book Parent would insist.

ONE immense difficulty outstares the author from his chosen subject, that is, the creation of a fictitious genius —actually two fictitious geniuses, but he, rightly, tends to neglect the actress for the writer of novels and histories. The reader tends to be stubborn about having characters put upon him as geniuses. If they are scientists or painters he may accept them on a minimum of data and fuss. But of literary genius he demands proof. Oblique reference to impressively titled publications will not do. Nor is the author's good faith in his fabricated genius nearly enough. Nor yet a bunch of other characters going around implying the genius of their central figure.

Mr. West does all of these things, and further, surrounds his genius with a furore of Mercedes-Benzes, eccentrically adoring mistresses, and villas the right distance outside Cannes. All these encumbrances, however, do not suggest the atmosphere of genius so much as that of a writer whose books sell well.

Perhaps to create a fictitious genius one needs to be an actual genius; and to use the dodge of writing about an actual man whom one believes to be a genius, or, to get away from that unsatisfactory word, to be a great man, by misnomering him and in this thin disguise presenting him in the courts of fiction, is only to add to the difficulties. Or so it would appear from Mr. West's novel. For then the wretchedly troublesome reader, recognizing the actual hero, is likely to say: I don't think he was a great man anyway. And, even if more favorably inclined towards the recognized hero, still the reader has the awareness of his own knowledge of the man and his books, which may distract and detract from the author's good and hard work in presenting his case. Thus the reader's attention is divided between the actual man and the resembling man. This is a nuisance particularly in this instance where the author's unique viewpoint could demand the full attention of his audience. The problem of comparison between Mr. West's great man, and the great man he resembles, is one continually creeping out of this longish novel. The author claims his Max Town, for instance, as a brilliantly prophetic conversationalist on, among other things, political matters. This is how his brilliant conversation sounds at a brilliant table-full of ex-ministers *et cetera*:

> "Oh, I know those old boys, the military clique, were pretty bad, but they were nothing to this Brown Shirt crowd—I went to a meeting in Leipzig a couple of months ago and listened to a lunatic dervish—a fellow called Hitler—the crowd lapped it up, and his rowdies marched through the streets as if they owned them—that's the man who's going to take over Germany in a year or two—and when he does, then you'll see something. I tell you the Europe we've known all our lives is breaking up. That Russian thing was only a beginning, those weren't Asiatic horrors—they're the horrors of a new time. . . . "

This is knowledgeable and foresighted enough. But great stuff? If this conversation were accurate reportage it would reflect on the flat and scrappy style of expression by the speaker, and one could only blame the writer for putting such lumps of it into his book. Since the novelist is reconstructing (one presumes) the conversation, he must take all the blame for its deadening effect.

WHEN not trying to impress with his hero's greatness, Mr. West's book is much more impressive. It poses an attitude which is, for a contemporary English novelist, wonderfully free of class-pull and the intricate net of social snobbery. It is as refreshing as a cold beer to come across a child who managed to grow up, in Kensington, without a nanny; and who, later, as a young man, can stand, invited by his host, on a ridge of Country Home parkland, survey the distinct strata, and

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maintain his balance. Mr. West displays, with a gentle and convincing touch, the weakness and the bravura, the modesty, the gestures of humility and generosity, the being hurt and hated, the chase that loses its objective, the despair and satisfaction, the bitterness and the exhibition of love, that are in the man he calls Max Town. This man is not an easily liked or understood or acceptable great man. The author has liked and understood him and shown him in such a light that it would be harpingly sectarian not to be partly won over, and for all his short stature he was conspicuous among those of his time. He becomes more easily understood, and the son remains becomingly reticent.

The book represents a strongly sympathetic view of human affairs, a view that has not been romanticized as it might have been, nor moralized over as many may think it preferably should have been. The author has treated his subject with devotion and pride, while determinedly submitting these qualities to a scrutinizing honesty, and if scrutinizing honesty in the hands of some novelists has rendered the novel by now pretty groggy, this grogginess is no doubt a desired effect. But these honesty-obsessed writers should realize that it is not as easy as it might appear to remove the nervous system for examination and leave the animal alive and throbbing. There is the risk of their being left holding a corpse. If all that they are after is the way things work, they must at least know how to trim an obstreperous truth to a delighting fact.

Too Many People

by Bruce Bliven

DR. SAX has written a good book on what seems to him, and me, and a few other people, a tremendously important subject. Since the rest of the world flies into a great state of calm about it, I am forced to the embarrassing conclusion that either Dr. Sax and I are crazy, or a lot of other people are.

The population of the world is increasing by at least 70,000 persons per day, or 25 million per year. This is a phenomenon unique in all the annals of time. Until four or five centuries ago, the number of people increased very slowly indeed, and probably at times not at all. Modern civilization, with its improvements in medicine and all aspects of technology, has caused the human horde to quadruple in only the past three centuries. At present, the fastest-growing countries are doubling their population every 25 years, the slowest, with a few unimportant exceptions, every 70 years. World population by the year 2000—only 45 years from now—is expected to increase from the present 2.5 billion to at least four billion. One hundred years from now, it is likely to be 7.5 billion.

Standing Room Only: The Challenge of Over-Population, by Karl Sax (Beacon; $3).

The result of this tremendous increase is that already, in large areas of the world, population is out-running food supply. Two-thirds of the world's people go to bed hungry every night. Partly because of inadequate diet, their life expectancy is on the whole less than half of that in the United States, though they do not die until they have spawned their large average quota of children.

What chance is there of increasing the world food supply to offset the explosion of population? Nobody really knows what are the available resources of unused land, since there are huge areas in the world with unreliable statistics or none, but the most optimistic guesses of the experts say that an increase of 30 percent is as much as can reasonably be expected. The land not now cultivated is in almost all cases bad land. Indeed, much land now in use, all over the world, ought to be returned to grass or forest.

Technological advance can certainly do something to increase the food supply on land already under cultivation. Better fertilizers, big irrigation projects, antibiotics to speed up both animal and vegetable growth, new hybrids, desalting ocean water, eating more fish and perhaps even plankton, are hopeful approaches. Work is being done to develop yeasts and edible algae like Chlorella. Atomic energy may help. Great strides are being made toward artificially duplicating the process of photosynthesis, which if accomplished would give us an almost unlimited food supply.

While nobody can read the future, we have to act as though we could, and the best judgment available, based on all the information we have, is that all these things combined will not be good enough, by far. Barring a breakthrough on photosynthesis, the most we can reasonably hope is an increase in food of perhaps 50 percent in the next few decades. Double this if you wish, and it is still not enough. World population is sure to outrun world food, if not in 50 years, then in 75, if not in 75, then in 100. To give even the present population of the world the barest minimum adequate diet, the amount of food should be doubled within one decade—something that seems completely impossible.

IN these circumstances it appears incredible that nobody is much concerned about this situation except for a few college-professor types and unfrocked college professors like myself. Why should this be so?

Probably one important reason is, so far as Americans are concerned, that we have all been trained to an incorrigible optimism. We are sure that science will somehow find a way out. Anyhow, the disaster is, we feel, a long way off from ourselves, both in time and space.

We have been told that industrialization slows down the birth rate, and therefore the population increase; but this is not necessarily true. A birth rate of 25 per 1,000 and a death rate of nine or ten, the situation in the United States today, results in the large increase of about 1.5 percent per annum, one as great as is created by a birth rate of 40 and a death rate of 25.

Another stumbling block is that overpopulation is connected with the question of sex, public discussion of which is either taboo, or at least, makes everybody uncomfortable. It is sometimes hard to remember that even today, 95 percent of all Americans live in a pre-Freudian world. Moreover, birth control, which is certainly at the heart of the problem, is considered to be somehow a left-wing doctrine, tied up with political and economic radicalism, if not with cranks and crackpots.

And finally, restriction on population is opposed on religious grounds by the Catholics and on philosophic grounds (which might as well be religious) by

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the Communists and their secret allies in all countries. Over and over again, the Roman Catholic press announces that the Malthusian theory has now been disproved, on evidence which justifies no such conclusion; the latest excuse was a report of the Food and Agriculture Organization showing an increase in the food production of the free world during the past decade. This very report, however, showed population overtaking food so fast that the margin of improvement is only two percent! Nevertheless, the Catholics are on the whole less stubbornly unreasonable than the Communists. The official church position now tolerates the "rhythm method" of contraception which, while it is not wholly reliable, works about 65 percent of the time, and is therefore a great deal better than nothing.

The Communist attitude stems from the general theory that Marxism solves all problems, is in fact a limitless cornucopia of plenty—an idea which Russian experience disproves. While the Russian food supply has been increased only 20 percent, the population has gone up 50 percent.

The resistances mentioned above will operate against the book under review. Dr. Karl Sax is a reputable scientist, a professor of botany at Harvard, who is also the master of a simple and lucid writing style. While this volume contains little that is new to the careful student of the subject, it is comprehensive, vigorous and fearless. His name must now be added to those of Harrison Brown, Robert Cook, Fairfield Osborn, William Vogt and a few others who are trying to warn us of the worldwide calamity we confront. I am sorry to record my belief that his book, like all the others, seems sure to be largely ignored by the press, reviewed perfunctorily or not at all, and read almost exclusively by those who already agree with him. The world is not ready to admit that a crisis exists, still less to attempt to do anything about it.

Technology and Change

by Robert Lekachman

THERE seem to be almost as many ways of writing history as there are historians. Everything from the horse collar to the rites of the Druids has caught some historian's fancy. There is no reason to be surprised, therefore, at yet one more approach to a human record which endures any amount of explanation. Mr. Cottrell, a Professor of Government and Sociology who is obviously also at home in economics and the history of science, has chosen to center his attention upon the uses of energy and the efficiency with which it is converted into usable form. So we read about low-energy societies dependent upon the muscles of human beings and draft animals, and high-energy societies which have mastered the machine.

Energy and Society, by Fred Cottrell (McGraw-Hill; $6).

How much does energy explain? As an account of historical change, movement from low to high energy-converters is obviously incomplete, for it never tells us why some societies eagerly adopt the latest techniques available or, even better, invent them, and others resist to the best of their ability their introduction either by natives or strangers. Mr. Cottrell consigns the answers to questions of this kind to that vast sociological compound, "social structure." It is presumably this unanalyzed set of forces which explains why the United States has welcomed modern technology to a unique degree, and has devoted itself with unsparing energy to its improvement. And presumably it is social structure once again which accounts for France's stubborn refusal to join the modern world and for Japan's protracted resistance to Western techniques and then her sudden conversion to them. It would be unfair to say that Mr. Cottrell neglects the role of other elements in historical change, but accurate to accuse him of overemphasizing his favorite: energy.

Much of this book analyzes contemporary society without explaining its development. Mr. Cottrell is a pessimist about both high and low energy societies. India is a typical modern low-energy society. Here remedy, it is often glibly said, is industrialization in the factory and mechanization on the farm. But, notes Mr. Cottrell, if no Indian peasant lived on a farm smaller than 25 acres, 30 million peasant families would be displaced from the land in the next ten years. Where are the thirty million industrial jobs to employ them? And the irony of the proposition is that these 25-acre farms would be still too small to permit the use of efficient high energy converters—the tractors and the combines which are commonplace in the United States. The whole precarious proposal rests moreover on the assumption that no change in survival rates will occur. It is against this sombre background that our foreign aid programs must operate, in a world which has not yet exorcised the Malthusian devil or accepted salvation, American style.

The problems of the high-energy society, while different, are equally depressing. According to Mr. Cottrell, the high-energy society tends to create ever larger and more expensive machines, factories, and industrial complexes. Necessarily these assets are owned either by large, diffuse groups of individuals powerless to influence the actions of "their" corporation or by the government. In either event, the individual loses control over his own environment and becomes subject to the largely impersonal decisions of his government or his employer.

Moreover, everything changes so rapidly around him that the individual suffers from chronic status insecurity. The clear status lines of the low-energy society which enable a man to identify himself securely as a farmer, artisan, soldier, or official have disappeared. Two statuses are left: citizen and consumer and these are too generalized to permit much satisfaction.

In saying all this Mr. Cottrell strays at times from energy *per se* and his conclusions, despite the unusual pair of spectacles through which he looks, much resemble those of other observers who have also noted the enlarging role of government, the increasing size of the business enterprise, the diminishing importance of the individual, the rising cult of nationalism, and the existence of many worlds, not one. At the end he has left unexplained his central dynamic. Is energy fated to be released in yet more efficient forms? Will the train of consequences already realized be accelerated? Perhaps it is as well that we don't know the answers to such questions.

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TELEVISION

FOR YEARS NOW, the cold wars and diplomatic negotiations between Hollywood and the TV networks have been reported in as much detail as if the whole affair made any difference. I have read of the feuds and alliances of these titans with only the mildest interest, for it seemed to me that they had no real connection with the quality or the cost (to me) of what I saw in the movie theater or in my living room. Now I find, in my living room, that I was wrong.

Of course, Hollywood has been a part of television for a long time. The corpses of old movies have always filled up the graveyard hours on the daily program; Hollywood stars stare out of the tube every night of the week; and a great many of the shows on film bear the recognizable imprint of Hollywood production methods. But the use of television to sell Hollywood's own is a fairly recent development. I blame the whole thing (and a good many other things) on Ed Sullivan, who has, on numerous occasions, presented trailers, or previews, of motion pictures on the CBS *Toast of the Town*. Mr. Sullivan usually has one or two of the stars on hand to give some point to the proceedings, but I am still completely bowled over by his gall in offering such stuff as entertainment.

A very different kind of huckstering for Hollywood is done by Walt Disney on ABC's *Disneyland*. Unlike Mr. Sullivan, who breaks up his vaudeville show to slap you in the face with a big, fat slice of Hollywood promotion, Mr. Disney is promoting *all* the time. He is promoting the products of Walt Disney, and, for the most part, he does the job with skill. By means of film clips he reminds you of the wonderful things he has done in the past and informs you of the even more wonderful things he has ready for you now. He takes you "behind the scenes"—usually a pretty bleak destination in television commercials—and, in the process of showing how *Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea* was filmed, turns out a much more entertaining film than *Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea*. He is, of course, addressing himself primarily to children, whose special tactics he seems to have very well pegged. Adults might assume that, having seen *Davy Crockett* or *Treasure Island* on television, a child would have no interest in seeing *Davy Crockett* or *Treasure Island* at a Saturday matinee; but Walt knew that having seen the thing once, the kid would scream to see it again, and working on this same theory, he repeats his television shows—over and over.

All this brings me to the outright invasion of television by the Hollywood studios this season. I have not yet worked up enough courage to face *Warner Brothers Presents* (ABC), which, I've read, consists of plays based on characters created in three Warner Brothers movies; but I have watched *MGM Parade* on ABC, and it was an unnerving experience. Here is a frankly commercial show, out to sell MGM, and what do you think? There were sponsors. In between the long MGM commercials were short commercials advertising Pall Malls and Minute Rice. (There are also sponsors for Disney's show, but as I've said, Disney can get away with almost anything.)

MGM's George Murphy was the friendly fellow who welcomed me to *MGM Parade* and showed me the sights. First of all he showed me his office, which was loaded with priceless memorabilia like the helmet Van Johnson wore in MGM's *Battleground* and the helmet Robert Taylor wore in MGM's *Ivanhoe*. Later, he showed me some aerial views of the MGM studios as they appeared in 1924, when, he told me, they covered only forty acres, and some views of the studios today, sprawling over more than two hundred acres. And he warned me that in the weeks ahead I was going to be dragged through just about every building on the lot, not a cheering prospect.

Mr. Murphy also showed film clips. Twelve-year-old Judy Garland sang "You Made Me Love You" to a picture of Clark Gable, and Mr. Murphy and Fred Astaire did a fifteen-year-old song-and-dance number called "Don't Monkey With Broadway," which was a lot of fun. There was also a how-it-all-began clip concerning Leland Stanford's bet that a racing horse lifts all four hoofs off the ground. And, finally, after MGM's Dore Schary had made a pointless appearance, MGM's Cyd Charisse let it be known that she had just completed an MGM musical called *It's Always Fair Weather*, Mr. Murphy thereupon served up a preview. The setting was a gymnasium, the chorus was made up of pugs wearing head-guards and sweat shirts, and Miss Charisse sang a frightful song called "Baby, You Knock Me Out."

Next week, Mr. Murphy told me, MGM's Gene Kelly would appear on *MGM Parade*. Gene Kelly, surprisingly enough, is the star of *It's Always Fair Weather*. Mr. Murphy said that when that movie came to *his* neighborhood theater, he might see it twice.

MGM Parade comes on immediately after *Disneyland*. That just about takes care of Wednesday evenings, when you can have ninety consecutive minutes of Hollywood commercials, as long as a feature picture, and free.

DAVID R. EBBITT

STATEMENT OF THE OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND CIRCULATION required by the Act of Congress of August 24, 1912, as amended by the Acts of March 3, 1933, and July 2, 1946 (Title 39, United States Code, Section 233) of the New Republic published weekly at Washington, D. C., for October 17, 1955.

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5. The average number of copies of each issue of the publications sold or distributed through the mails or otherwise, to paid subscribers during the 12 months preceding the date shown above was 27,242.

ALLAN E. AIRD
Signature of business manager

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 30th day of September, 1955

DORIS E. DAY, Notary Public. My commission expires June 30, 1959.

Notes on Contributors

CUSHING STROUT teaches at Yale. CASHENDEN CASS is a young British writer. BRUCE BLIVEN, for many years the editor of *The New Republic*, writes from retirement in California. ROBERT LEKACHMAN, who teaches at Barnard College, is the editor of a new book, *National Policy for Economic Welfare*. DAVID R. EBBIT is at the University of Chicago. EDOUARD RODITI is a free-lance writer working in Europe.

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A Communication

Book-Buying in East Berlin

BOOKSTORES, in the almost deserted streets of East Berlin, seem better supplied with books than with customers. On the shelves, one finds a fascinating choice of Russian classics in excellent German translations; many of them masterpieces not translated in any other West European language. All the works of Gontcharow, for instance, and of Saltykow-Schedrin, and a good many works by Vladimir Korolenko and Gleb Ouspensky are available. Korolenko's huge two-volume autobiography, *The Story of One of My Contemporaries* can now be purchased in German, and makes fascinating reading. Among his translated stories collected in another volume, Korolenko's sly, satirical novelette of the life of poor Russian immigrants in America, written in 1895, now comes as a refreshingly realistic variation on the theme of alienation that Kafka's *Amerika* handled in so different a manner.

To most of these recently translated Russian classics, the Western reader can object, at most, to the critical introduction or appendix, which is always orthodox in its Marxism and sometimes strangely unimaginative. Korolenko's *To America,* for instance, is surely published in German because of its satire on the corruption of Tammany Hall politics, but it seems to have escaped the editors that the author's presentation of Russian immigrants as simpletons implies just as good-natured a criticism of the Russians.

Hungarian, Polish, Czech and Bulgarian classics are also on sale in German translations, many of them translated only in these editions published recently in Eastern Berlin. Among recent novelists from these other "Peoples' Democracies," the Hungarian Tibor Dery seems, with *The Unfinished Sentence,* a two-volume social epic of life in Budapest in the last few decades, to be one of the few whose work aims at a quality above mere propaganda.

Some American authors are on display in East-German editions. William S. Blake's *The Copperheads* is a popular item, also Howard Fast's *Citizen Tom Paine* and his *Patrick Henry and the Frigate's Keel.* Haakon Chevalier's *For Us the Living* has, however, not sold well — perhaps because the landscape on the jacket gave German readers the idea that it might be another epic of the land with which they became so familiar under the Nazis. Chevalier's forthcoming novel on the FBI's handling of the Oppenheimer case is expected to interest more buyers; Phillip Bonosky's *Burning Valley* is selling well; and Stefan Heym's *Crusaders* and *Goldsborough* have been, of course, best sellers. An edition of the complete works of Dreiser has also been published.

Among Latin American authors, Ciro Alegria and Jorge Amando are both popular. The Indian writer Mulk Rai Anand and a number of Australian and South African Leftists have been translated into German with varying success.

From a long talk with an East-German editor, I formed the impression that the readers of the main state publications in Soviet Berlin are far better informed about the literary life of the Western world than we are about that of Eastern Germany or, for that matter, of Soviet Russia. The Ford Foundation's *Perspectives,* for instance, is regularly read behind the Iron Curtain as a valuable guide to America's cultural life. Though the officials of East-German publishing trusts turn up their noses at such "decadent capitalist" authors as Henry Miller, Paul Frederic Bowles, Kenneth Patchen and Tennessee Williams, they regret that the German rights of Saul Bellow, Norman Mailer, Richard Wright, Herman Wouk and James Jones are not available to them, these rights having been snapped up by West-German publishers.

East Berlin shows many indications of the slight thaw in the Cold War. For this change the publishing world of the East is better prepared than that of the West. American authors and publishers may well, in the near future, receive more frequent and more lucrative offers for translation rights from Behind the Iron Curtain. But one wonders what East-German authors American publishers, were they prepared to reciprocate, might now offer to launch in America.

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MEMO:

to New Republic readers

from: GEORGE G. KIRSTEIN

new publisher of THE *Nation*

THE NEW publisher of an established magazine like *The Nation* has an obligation to readers, advertisers, and the public generally to state his position regarding the future policies of the paper. *The Nation* has a proud past as a voice for liberalism in America. It has stood through nearly a century for progress and reform.

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